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 Beckwith v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 83 P.3d 275 (Nev. 2004)1 
 
 CONTRACT LAW - INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSES 
 
Summary 
 Appellant Beckwith, acting in a state of intoxication after having voluntarily ingested 
alcohol, marijuana, and LSD, experienced hallucinations and disrobed.  Co-appellent Reccelle 
confronted Beckwith as there were children playing in the area.  Beckwith contends that he 
thought he was a dog and that Reccelle was his “evil master,” and that he felt the need to act in 
self-defense.  Acting on his delusions, Beckwith struck and injured Reccelle.  Beckwith pleaded 
nolo contendere to criminal charges, and, when Reccelle filed a civil complaint, Beckwith 
requested that Appellee, State Farm Fire and Casualty, provide defense and indemnification 
under the provisions of Beckwith’s homeowners’ insurance policy.  State Farm denied the 
request and filed for a declaratory judgment affirming non-coverage under the policy. 
 State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the incident was not an 
“occurrence” within the definition of the policy, being excluded under the “intentional acts” 
provision.  Appellants argue that Beckwith’s state of intoxication precluded intentional action.  
Further, Beckwith argues that, at the time of the incident, he (mistakenly) believed he was acting 
in self-defense, which would preclude a finding that his actions were intentional. 
 The district court found for defendant, granting the requested summary judgment, 
concluding the incident was not covered under Beckwith’s policy.  Appellants jointly appealed. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
Issue 
 The sole issue before the court is whether acts actively committed by one in a 
voluntarily-induced state of intoxication may be held to be intentional as defined within the 
homeowners’ liability insurance policy.  Appellants assert that, as policyholder was under the 
influence of intoxicating and hallucinatory agents, he was unable to act intentionally.  
Defendant’s position is that the actions were intentional, despite policyholder’s mistaken 
perceptions of reality at the time of the occurrence. 
 
Disposition 
 The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s ruling de novo, and affirmed its 
findings.  Voluntary intoxication does not negate intent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1By Ira David 
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Court’s Rationale 
 The court used the plain meaning of the insurance policy, and the dictionary definition of 
accident, to distinguish accidental from unintentional, not from mistaken or erroneous.  The 
actions taken by Beckwith were intentional, i.e. not accidental, although they may have been 
made under mistaken beliefs, or the results may not have been as desired.  As the actions were 
intentional, they fell within the exclusion as defined in the insurance policy, and hence coverage 
was properly denied. 
 
State of the Law Prior to, and Subsequent to, Beckwith 
 The Beckwith decision relies on the court’s similar ruling in Mallin v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange.2  Stare decisis was applied, Beckwith’s arguments to the contrary. 
 Similarly, there was no change to the law following this case.  Beckwith simply confirms, 
and affirms, the prior position of the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Survey of Law in Other Jurisdictions 
 The court references a number of cases from outside of Nevada, all of which arrive at 
similar conclusions.  State court holdings from Texas,3 Louisiana,4 New York,5 Arizona,6 
Missouri7 and Wisconsin8 are all cited in support of the court’s position.  No cases are discussed 
in the court’s holding which support the position taken by the appellants. 
 Some such cases are discussed in the dissenting opinion.  These cases may be broken into 
two groups.  First, there are those cases for which the intentional acts exclusion clause in the 
homeowners’ policy is different than that in the instant case.9  Second, there are those cases 
which do not dispute that the exclusion clause may be applied in cases where the insured has 
                                                 
2839 P.2d 105 (Nev. 1992). 
3Wessinger v. Fire Ins. Exch., 949 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tex.App. 1997) (“voluntary intoxication cannot be used to 
defeat the intent requirement in an insurance policy). 
4Hooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 782 So.2d 1029, 1033 (La.Ct.App. 2001) (striking another in the face 
with a close fist is an intentional act, despite the claim that it was not). 
5Royal Indem. Co. v. Love, 630 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (1995) (intentional assault cannot be an accident as it is an 
intentional act). 
6Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 939 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Ariz. 1997) (where the actions of the insured are such that 
harm is likely to occur, the intentional acts exclusion is applicable). 
7Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 189 (Mo.Ct.App. 1979) (whether the insured was under the 
influence is not relevant to whether the act of swinging a machete falls under the intentional acts exclusion). 
8Ludwig v. Dulian, 579 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Wis. 1998) (where the actions of insured are purposeful and substantially 
certain to cause injury, insurance coverage is precluded under the intentional acts exclusion, even where the insured 
may claim not to have intended any harm). 
9E.g., Hanover Insurance Co. v. Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689, 690-91 (Mass. 1992) (where the clause precludes 
coverage for “bodily injury or property damage which is expected or intended by the insured” which means that it is 
the damage which is expected or intended, not the act itself). 
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formed an intent to act, but refer the question of ability to form such and intent to a jury.10  Even 
in these cases, the issue is not directly whether the ability to act with intent was present, but 
rather whether the decision is properly made by the judge or by the trier of fact. 
 Despite the questions raised in the dissent, and the cases cited therein, the prevailing 
position in most, if not all, jurisdictions is that absent a showing that the insured was so 
intoxicated as to be unaware of their actions and unable to control their own actions, voluntary 
intoxication does not provide an argument with which to dispute the denial of coverage under the 
intentional acts exclusion clause of a homeowners’ insurance policy, i.e. does not negate intent. 
 
Concurrence 
 Justice Agosti’s concurrence points out that the court’s position is limited to cases in 
which the intoxication was voluntary.  If the intoxication had been forced upon the insured, 
Justice Agosti indicates she would favor coverage under the policy. 
 
Dissent 
 Justices Rose and Shearing rely on Republic Insurance v. Feidler11 which places a higher 
awareness requirement for the exclusionary clause of a homeowners’ policy than that invoked 
for criminal action such as aggravated assault.  Arizona requires that, for the exclusion to apply, 
the insured had to have an awareness of the expected results of their actions.  Absent such a 
showing, denial of coverage was held improper.  While denial of a defense of voluntary 
intoxication in a criminal case is a matter of public policy, foreclosing the option of a convenient 
defense and the evasion of responsibility, in a civil case where insurance coverage is the issue, 
the public policy is less clear.  The insured would still have the responsibility to prove to the 
satisfaction of a trier of fact that the state of intoxication was sufficient to deny the insured any 
minimal level of intent, but such a defense would be allowable. 
 The dissent does not in any way indicate that the insurer should automatically be held 
liable.  Rather, they would rather the trier of fact make the determination, as opposed to the judge 
on summary judgment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Beckwith is a verdict that favors insurance providers.  Homeowners’ insurance policy 
holders may not assert voluntary intoxication to dispute denial of coverage where such denial is 
based upon the intentional acts exclusion clause of their policies.  However, this was not a 
unanimous decision.  It was a 4-2 ruling, and so may be attacked again in the future, although 
reversal would still require the insured to show that the intoxication was sufficient to preclude 
any intentional action.  Finally, this decision only applies under conditions of voluntary 
intoxication, and the question remains open for circumstances where the intoxication is either 
                                                 
10See generally, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flagg, 789 A.2d 586 (Del.Super 2001). 
11Republic Insurance v. Fiedler, 875 P.2d 187, 191-92 (Ariz.App. 1993) (distinguishing the intent component of the 
insurance exclusion from that needed to convict on a charge of aggravated assault). 
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imposed upon the insured, or occurs as a result of error or accident. 
